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SECURITY FOR EXPENSE STATUTES: EASING
SHAREHOLDER HOPELESSNESS?
Miriam R. Albert*
ABSTRACT
The quintessential derivative suit is a suit by a shareholder to force the
corporation to sue a manager for fraud, which is admittedly an
awkward and likely unpleasant endeavor and, according to the
Supreme Court, a “remedy born of stockholder helplessness.”1 Where
ownership and control of an enterprise are vested in the same
population, the need for a corrective mechanism like a derivative suit
is greatly lessened because the owner/managers’ self-interests will
arguably guide managerial conduct. But where ownership and control
are in separate hands, the incentives change, and managerial conduct
may not conform to the owners’ views of the best course of action.
This may lead to what the owners consider to be director misconduct.
The existing corporate laws have not been effective in stopping this
kind of director misconduct, so “stockholders, in face of gravest
abuses, were singularly impotent in obtaining redress of abuses of
trust.”2 In these situations, shareholders are arguably in need of legal
strategies to protect themselves from abuses by management.
Presumably in an effort to limit the abuse of strike suits that would
take up managerial time, resources, and corporate dollars, several
significant procedural hurdles for derivative plaintiffs have arisen,
including the requirement of contemporaneous share ownership—a
requirement that derivative plaintiffs make a “demand” on the
corporation, in particular, to take requested action—the lack of access
to the discovery process, and compliance with any relevant security
for expense statutes. Balancing the right of shareholders to hold their
directors accountable against the need for directors to have the
freedom and autonomy to discharge their statutory and fiduciary
duties is no easy feat. That said, these hurdles, when combined, may
* Professor of Skills, Maurice A. Deane School of Law, Hofstra University. B.A., Tufts
University; J.D./M.B.A., Emory University; LL.M, New York University School of Law.
E-mail: miriam.r.albert@hofstra.edu. The author would like to thank Mary Morandini
and Michael Guzowski for their stellar research assistance.
1. Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 548 (1949).
2. Id.
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erode or even undermine the ultimate utility of the derivative litigation
process.
This Article provides an evaluation and analysis of one of the primary
procedural roadblocks facing derivative plaintiffs as they seek to hold
their corporations accountable: the security for expense statute. The
Article compares existing security for expense statutes in nine states,
while offering observations on those challenges present in the current
statutes, as well as new challenges flowing from the statutes. The
Article also evaluates the limited amount of case law flowing from the
statutes, as part of an evaluation of the usefulness of this mechanism
as a gatekeeper in derivative litigation. Finally, the Article provides
recommendations for legislative reform and modifications to existing
doctrine to help further the goals of shareholder empowerment
through the derivative litigation process, while keeping the potential
for strike suits in check.
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INTRODUCTION
The quintessential derivative suit is one filed by a shareholder to
force the corporation to sue a manager for fraud, which is admittedly an
awkward and likely unpleasant endeavor and, according to the Supreme
Court, a “remedy born of stockholder helplessness.”3 The Court noted that
in the absence of derivative litigation, directors were “not subject to an
effective accountability,” thereby arguably creating incentives for
directors to misbehave.4 The derivative suit, thus, was “long the chief
regulator of corporate management.”5
Stockholders who hold no concurrent management role are indeed
limited in their arsenal to combat perceived managerial neglect or
malfeasance. Other than exercising their voting rights to bring about a
change in management, these shareholders are at the whim of their elected

3. Id. at 548; see also John Matheson, Restoring the Promise of the Shareholder
Derivative Suit, 50 GA. L. REV. 327, 334 (2016):
The crux of the derivative suit is that a shareholder seeks to have the corporation enforce
supposed rights or claims that the corporation has not yet asserted . . . the historical
focus of the derivative suit has been an attempt by shareholders to hold the corporate
board or officers accountable for perceived harm to the corporation caused by a
violation of their fiduciary duties.
4. Cohen, 337 U.S. at 547.
5. Id. at 548.

36

FORDHAM JOURNAL
OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW

[Vol. XXIV

and appointment champions, subject to the not insignificant fiduciary
duties imposed on these managers.6
Where ownership and control of an enterprise are vested in the same
population, the need for a corrective mechanism like a derivative suit is
greatly lessened because the owner/managers’ self-interests will arguably
guide managerial conduct. But where ownership and control are in
separate hands, the incentives change and managerial conduct may not
conform to the owners’ views of the best course of action. This may lead
to what the owners consider to be director misconduct. The existing
corporate laws have not been effective in stopping this kind of director
misconduct, so “stockholders, in face of gravest abuses, were singularly
impotent in obtaining redress of abuses of trust.”7 In these situations,
shareholders are arguably in “need of legal [strategies] to protect
them[selves] from abuses by [] management.”8
While derivative suits have been characterized as “the chief regulator
of corporate management”9 and “the most important procedure the law
has yet developed to police the internal affairs of corporations,”10 this
form of litigation has its share of critics and has generated some degree
of controversy since its debut in the 1855 Supreme Court case Dodge v.

6. See Bryant G. Garth, Ilene H. Nagel & Sheldon J. Plager, Empirical Research
and the Shareholder Derivative Suit: Toward a Better-Informed Debate, 48 L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 137 (Summer 1985).
When control and investment are separated, as is so often the case in the modern
business corporation, the accountability of management to the shareholders becomes a
central concern. This concern is triggered by, but not limited to, the shareholders’
narrow pecuniary interest: it implicates notions of mutuality of consent, of fair dealing,
and of moral responsibility to those over whom or over whose interests one has power.
In this context the responsibilities of the corporate manager are often cast in terms of
fiduciary duties—duties which historically have arisen out of relationships of trust and
confidence.

Id. at 138.
7. Cohen, 337 U.S. at 548.
8. Kenneth E. Scott, Corporation Law and the American Law Institute Corporate
Governance Project, 35 STAN. L. REV. 927, 927 (1983).
9. Cohen, 337 U.S. at 548.
10. Daniel J. Dykstra, The Revival of the Derivative Suit, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 74, 77
(1967) (quoting Eugene V. Rostow, To Whom and for What Ends is Corporate
Management Responsible?, in THE CORPORATION IN MODERN SOCIETY 46, 48 (Edward
Mason ed. 1959)).
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Woolsey.11 While derivative litigation offers shareholders the right to hold
their directors accountable, this remedy itself also provides opportunities
for abuse by the very shareholders the process seeks to protect.12
Presumably in an effort to limit the abuse of strike suits that would take
up both managerial time and resources, as well as corporate dollars,
several significant procedural hurdles for derivative plaintiffs have
arisen,13 including the requirement of contemporaneous share ownership.
Under this requirement, derivative plaintiffs must make a “demand” on
the corporation, with particularity,14 to take requested action without
access to the discovery process,15 and complying with any relevant

11. Dodge v. Woolsey, 59 U.S. 331 (1855). Commentators agree that Dodge v.
Woolsey was the first shareholder derivative lawsuit. See Larry Hamermesh, A Most
Adequate Response to Excessive Shareholder Litigation, 45 HOFSTRA L. REV. 147, 152
(2016) (citing RALPH C. FERRARA ET AL., SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE SUITS: BESIEGING
THE BOARD § 1.03 (2d ed. 2015) (“[T]he Supreme Court’s decision in Dodge v. Woolsey,
firmly established the equitable jurisdiction of American courts to entertain shareholders’
derivative actions.”)); see also John C. Coffee, Jr. & Donald E. Schwartz, The Survival
of the Derivative Suit: An Evaluation and a Proposal for Legislative Reform, 81 COLUM.
L. REV. 261, 261 n.2 (1981); Garth, et al., supra note 6.
12. According to the Supreme Court:
Suits sometimes were brought not to redress real wrongs, but to realize upon their
nuisance value. They were bought off by secret settlements in which any wrongs to the
general body of share owners were compounded by the suing stockholder, who was
mollified by payments from corporate assets. These litigations were aptly characterized
in professional slang as ‘strike suits.’ And it was said that these suits were more
commonly brought by small and irresponsible than by large stockholders, because the
former put less to risk and a small interest was more often within the capacity and
readiness of management to compromise than a large one.

Cohen, 337 U.S. at 548.
13. Garth et al., supra note 6, at 139.
14. Franklin S. Wood, the author of a comprehensive study of derivative suits that
has come to be known as “The Wood Report” addresses this challenge: “[d]ealing now
with the sufficiency of particular allegations, the mere allegation of demand and refusal
to sue is insufficient, since it does not adequately establish the exhaustion of the plaintiff’s
remedies before resort to equity.” FRANKLIN S. WOOD, SURVEY AND REPORT REGARDING
STOCKHOLDERS’ DERIVATIVE SUITS 59 (1944) [hereinafter The Wood Report].
15. “The difficulty of drawing a complaint on facts of which the plaintiffs have no
first hand knowledge or sources of information was originally felt to warrant considerable
lenience in judging the sufficiency of a complaint . . . This view is now believed to have
been overruled.” Id. at 58. The current approach in most statutes requiring derivative
plaintiffs to make a formal demand is to require specificity of facts. “The courts have
come to recognize this [unfounded claims], to appraise such general and adverbial

38

FORDHAM JOURNAL
OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW

[Vol. XXIV

security for expense statutes. Balancing the right of shareholders to hold
their directors accountable against the need for directors to have the
freedom and autonomy to discharge their statutory and fiduciary duties is
no easy feat.16 That said, these hurdles, when combined, may erode or
even undermine the ultimate utility of the derivative litigation process.17
Some critics find that the idea that the shareholders could weigh in
on managerial conduct outside of their franchise rights threatens the
unquestioned control of the enterprise by its corporate managers.18 And
most agree that the attorneys bringing these suits are the real parties in
interest in most cases.19 So how can we balance the desire to help and
allegations at their true value, and to apply increasing strictures upon general allegations
with no specific facts in support of them.” Id. at 59.
16. See Matheson, supra note 3, at 330.
17. According to Professor Scott:
The result of all this seems to be an absurd state of affairs. Ringing statements on the
sacredness of the management’s fiduciary responsibilities are accompanied by a series
of impediments to their enforcement. Each obstacle has its own peculiar history and
rationale, but their unifying theme purports to be fear of the ‘strike suit’—an
unwarranted action brought by an attorney in order to be bought off for a sum that is
less than the costs of defense.

Scott, supra note 8, at 942. According to Professor Matheson, “the current state of
derivative litigation is encumbered by a series of primarily procedural impediments that
make pursuit of the derivative claim unduly litigious and its successful prosecution
practically impossible.” Matheson, supra note 3, at 331.
18. According to Garth et al.:
The emergence of the derivative suit as a major threat to unquestioned control of the
business enterprise by corporate management has not gone unchallenged. The
challenges have not been motivated simply by venal self-interest of managerial powerwielders. Managers understandably may question procedures that, in the risk-laden
atmosphere of high finance and corporate business venture, could hold them to an ex
post facto measure of the reasonableness of their judgments.

Garth et al., supra note 6, at 139.
19. According to Professor Scott:
The obvious difficulty with using derivative suits as a means of ex post settling up is
the question of who will bring and pay for the suit. The corporation (which is to say its
management) will not, at least not in good faith; people are not strongly motivated to
sue themselves, and the loyalty actions we are concerned with necessarily implicate
members of the control group as defendants. The individual small shareholder in the
public corporation will not; he would bear 100% of the risk and expense in return for
an infinitesimal share of the benefit that will redound to all of the shareholders. This
free rider problem, which otherwise would defeat enforcement of fiduciary duties, has
been surmounted in practice by giving the plaintiff’s attorney the right to obtain
attorney’s fees if successful. Thus, in the typical case, the attorney becomes the real
party in interest, and the suing stockholder becomes a nominal or figurehead plaintiff.
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empower shareholders to hold their corporations accountable with the
need for managerial freedom and discretion to discharge their fiduciary
duties without spurious and time-wasting litigation?
This Article provides an evaluation and analysis of one of the
primary procedural roadblocks facing derivative plaintiffs as they seek to
hold their corporation accountable: the security for expense statute. An
immutable truth about litigation is that it is costly—for all parties. The
cost of potential litigation can be an insurmountable roadblock to seeking
one’s day in court, particularly if the relevant state law requires the
plaintiff to post security.
The theory behind these security for expense statutes is that they will
act as a sieve and somehow weed out strike suits that have no merit. A
major problem is that these suits have no true metric to determine which
suits are in fact meritorious.20 They all use a percentage of stock or market
value of stock owned, arguably as some sort of proxy for thoughtful and
meritorious litigation. The theory implicitly assumes that stockholders
with less than the required threshold will not bring meritorious claims; the
sole metric to determine if a shareholder is acting in good faith and, thus,
should be permitted a day in court, is the amount of stock owned.21 The
idea presumes that a major shareholder has a financial interest in not
wasting corporate time and resources on a frivolous claim and may be
deterred from posting the required bond.22 It does not follow, however,
that minority shareholders necessarily lack the same financial
incentives.23 The amount of stock, or even the market value of one’s stock,

Scott, supra note 8, at 940.
20. Justice Hanson, writing for the District Court of Appeal for the Second District
of California about the then-current California security for expense statute noted:
The test laid down by the statutes as to one who has participated in some act complained
of does not turn on whether the suit is or is not a “strike” suit but whether there is a
reasonable probability that its prosecution against the moving party will or will not
prove of ultimate benefit to the corporation or its security holders. The statute does not
distinguish between so-called strike suits and those that are generally classed as being
bona fide. The distinction between such suits is however well known and, indeed,
recognized by statutes of like tenor in other states. Accordingly, we must assume the
legislature was fully cognizant of those statutes and intended by the statute it enacted
not to differentiate between the two types of suits.

Wood v. Gordon, 246 P.2d 84, 86 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1952).
21. Hamermesh, supra note 11, at 156–57.
22. Id.
23. According to Professor Hamermesh:
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is not a perfect proxy for a metric to measure whether a particular
shareholder will be wasting corporate time and money. Yet, shareholders
whose holdings are below the relevant statutory threshold are required to
provide security in order for their claims to move forward.
Part I provides necessary background on derivative suits generally.
Part II examines and compares the nine existing security for expense
statutes, offering observations on those challenges present in the current
statutes and those new challenges flowing from these statutes. This Part
also evaluates the limited amount of case law flowing from these statutes,
as part of an evaluation of the usefulness of this mechanism as a
gatekeeper in derivative litigation. Part III provides recommendations for
legislative reform and modifications to existing doctrine that will help
further the goals of shareholder empowerment through the derivative
litigation process, while keeping the potential for strike suits in check.
I. DERIVATIVE LAWSUITS GENERALLY
One of the first examinations of the derivative suit came in the form
of a comprehensive study by the Chamber of Commerce of the State of
New York in the mid-1940s, known as the “Wood Report.”24 In his letter
introducing the report to the Special Committee on Corporate Litigation
[T]here is nothing in the statute that assures that a holder or a group of holders with
sufficient shares to avoid the bond requirement will have resources or motivations
adequate to ensure an informed, deliberate, and disinterested assessment of the merits
of the litigation. If only because of collective action problems, it seems eminently
possible that disaggregated stockholders will underinvest in efforts to evaluate and then
support meritorious litigation; and, it seems equally possible that stockholders with
enough shares to avoid the bond requirement but, without the inclination to invest in
evaluating derivative claims, could choose to support litigation that lacks merit. In sum,
what the New York security for expense statute lacks is any assurance that the persons
(other than plaintiff’s counsel) whose decisions determine whether a bond is required
will expend any resources to evaluate the quality of the derivative claims to be pursued.

Hamermesh, supra note 11, at 156.
24. The Wood Report covered all derivative suits filed in the Supreme Court of New
York and in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York between 1932
and 1942, and those derivative suits filed in the Supreme Court of Kings County between
1938 and 1942. Wood noted that “about sixty percent of the more substantial cases [were]
found to be conducted by a limited group of attorneys and law firms,” and that the
representative plaintiffs had very small stakes in the outcome. He then concluded that the
lawyers bringing these suits made “the ambulance-chaser by comparison a paragon of
propriety.” The Wood Report, supra note 14, at 47.
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of the Chamber of Commerce of the State of New York, author Robert
Wood set out the scope of the report and shed light on the issues leading
up to his engagement to prepare the report:
I have undertaken and been engaged since shortly prior to September
1, 1942, in an investigation and survey of litigation by minority
stockholders of corporations with a view to providing an adequate
basis of fact research to determine the advisability of possible changes
in law or procedure which would facilitate the correction of wrongdoing in corporate affairs but reduce groundless and costly litigation
of this type.25

Wood noted the “outstanding fact derived” from his survey to be an
observation that most stockholder derivative suits in his study were
unsuccessful and unfounded.26 Wood concluded that the financial results
of these suits were not favorable to the plaintiffs, and that the real party
in interest were the lawyers bringing the suits.27 According to Garth et al.,
“[Wood’s] conclusions thus led to a call for reform, culminating in
widespread adoption of the requirement of security for expense in
derivative suits.”28
One of the primary recommendations from the Wood Report was
that New York lawmakers enact a security for expense statute, with the
goal of effecting “a proper differentiation between actions involving
privately held and publicly held corporations and insure some
responsibility in the bringing of such actions in the latter instances where
25. The Wood Report, supra note 14, at 1.
26. As per Wood:
Because of the large recoveries had in a few instances involving nationally known
corporations, the enormous fees awarded plaintiffs’ attorneys in those cases and the
resulting newspaper publicity, there has been a definite tendency on the part of the
public and the bar to assume a ratio of success in these actions not in accord with the
record. In direct consequence of this general misconception, the common attitude on
the part of laymen and lawyers has been, while admitting the abuses in this field of
litigation, to condone them as necessary evils or as outweighed by the assumed
beneficial effects of such litigation. The record of these cases should demonstrate the
fallacy of this last assumption, and without that all excuses for further indulgence of
the abuses fails.

The Wood Report, supra note 14, at 112.
27. Wood did not have kind words for the shareholder derivative bar, referring to the
“shoddy burlesque of a professional relationship to clients [that] makes the ambulancechaser by comparison a paragon of propriety.” The Wood Report, supra note 14, at 47.
28. Garth et al., supra note 6, at 142-43.
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the plaintiffs’ stockholdings are too small to indicate legitimate personal
interest in the outcome and accordingly in the bringing of the action.”29
Commentators have made note of both the Wood Report’s influence,
its “clear anti-shareholder bias,”30 and “its confidence in the security for
expense device as the exclusive safeguard against abusive practices in
shareholder derivative litigation.”31
Wood referenced and rejected several proposals that he did not feel
would advance his goal.32 The first such proposal was to create a
committee of a lawyer, a director, and an accountant who would be
available to advise plaintiff stockholders in a non-binding fashion.33
Wood correctly concluded that the non-binding nature of such
committee’s recommendations “render it impotent against the strike
suit”34 and stockholders’ attorneys are “not likely to be given pause by the
recommendations of the committee.”35
The second proposal that Wood rejected is the idea of some sort of
preliminary court hearing to determine whether the derivative suit should
be permitted to proceed.36 He again concludes, correctly, that such an
approach would “either be inadequate from the plaintiff’s standpoint, or
double burdensome from the defendants’.”37
Wood also considered a proposal that actions by stockholders with
less than five percent of stock outstanding should be put to a shareholder
vote at stockholder meetings.38 His reasons for rejecting this proposal
stemmed from his concern that this might allow majority stockholders to
ratify their own wrongdoing.39 Wood concluded that:

29.
30.

The Wood Report, supra note 14, at 21.
PAUL J. GALANTI, SECURITY FOR EXPENSE STATUTES, 19 IND. PRAC., BUS. ORGS.
§ 38.25 (2017).
31. Id.
32. The Wood Report, supra note 14, at 22-23.
33. Id. at 22.
34. Id. at 23.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. “It would not be res adjudicata in another forum; it would inevitably involve a
costly reference, and since it would not be final, there would always be a disinclination
to deny trial on facts short of defenses which would warrant dismissal on motion.” Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 24.
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[i]deally and theoretically the real determination as to whether suit on
a particular corporate claim should or should not be brought should
rest with the stockholders. If the transaction were one which it was
beyond the power of a majority of stockholders to ratify, and if a
substantial percentage of the stockholders agreed that suit should be
brought, few would deny that it would be maintained without any
security for costs or imposition of costs in the event of failure. On the
other hand, no practicable way appears at present to insure such appeal
and determination by the stockholders. In the meantime analogy to the
safeguards already provided with respect to actions by bondholders
for accountings, actions by creditors in a corporation reorganization
proceedings and other similar situations where the fiction of the right
of one to represent all may give rise to an undue temptation to indulge
in litigation for the private profit of the fees involved, seems to
indicate an extension of the same principle to stockholders’ derivative
actions as the logical, fairest, most workable and at the same time
broadest solution for the entire problem.40

His ultimate conclusion and recommendation for a security for
expense statute honored his goal and allowed the shareholders to
determine whether to move forward in any given case, “safeguarded by
the requirement that the plaintiff have a legitimate interest in the subjectmatter and assume reasonable responsibility in the way of costs in the
event of failure.”41 Wood’s idea was that a “legitimate interest in the
subject matter” could be satisfied by some threshold of stock ownership.42
This idea is the cornerstone of all of the current security for expense
statutes which began to be adopted following the Wood Report in an
effort to discourage non-meritorious strike suits, starting with New York
in 1944.43
II. SECURITY FOR EXPENSE STATUTES
A. GOALS AND CHALLENGES OF THESE STATUTES
Following the Wood Report, the New York business community
succeeded in pressing for a security for expense statute that created
40.
41.
42.
43.

Id. at 117.
Id. at 116–17.
Id.
Garth et al., supra note 6; see also Donna I. Dennis, Contrivance and Collusion:
The Corporate Origins of Shareholder Derivative Litigation in the United States, 67
RUTGERS L. REV. 1479, 1519 (2015).
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liability for the corporation’s reasonable expenses if the derivative suit
failed. The statute requires a posting of security for reasonable expenses
by shareholders filing a derivative suit who own less than a set percentage
or dollar amount of shares.
Since the enactment of the New York security for expense statute, a
number of states have enacted similar statutes for various periods of
time.44 Nine states currently have enacted security for expense statutes.45
In these states, defendants in derivative suits are authorized to seek a court
order to require derivative plaintiffs to post a bond to secure such
expenses before the suit goes forward.46
Most of the security for expense statutes are structured the same way:
the defendant, which always includes the subject corporation but may also
include other defendants (presumably directors and officers) may move
to compel the plaintiff to post a bond to cover the defendants’ reasonable
expenses if the plaintiff’s shares do not meet any relevant statutory
minimum in terms of the percentage of ownership and/or market value.47
The required minimum share ownership ranges from $25,000 in
Arkansas, Colorado, and North Dakota to $250,000 in New Jersey.48
California is the only state with a ceiling, limiting the bond to no more
than $50,000, regardless of the number of defendants.49
The goal of these statutes was to deter baseless derivative suits, or
nuisance suits.50 Reasonable minds can differ on whether this has proven
true.51 Evaluating whether this goal has been satisfied is challenging. The
case law exploring these statutes is quite limited. Perhaps this makes
sense in that these statutes may have become a practical reality for
potential plaintiffs who do not want to confront additional economic risk
in litigation. These statutes put risks on plaintiffs not typically imposed in
44. Florida, Hawaii, Maryland, Nebraska, New Hampshire, Tennessee, Texas,
Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming all had previously enacted security for expense
statutes but have since eliminated the provisions. DEBORAH A. DEMOTT, SHAREHOLDER
DERIV. ACTIONS L. & PRAC. §§ 3.1, 3.2 (2017-2018).
45. See infra Part II.c.
46. DEMOTT, supra note 44, § 3.2.
47. See infra Part II.c.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. DEMOTT, supra note 44, § 3.1.
51. “The present trend appears to be away from reposing great confidence in the
ability of security requirements to deter strike suits.” Id.
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the United States where the general rule is that each side bears its own
litigation fees.52
Most security for expense statutes go beyond only requiring the bond
and create potential liability for the full amount of a successful
corporation’s costs and expenses, including, in most cases, attorney’s
fees.53
The timing of these statutes can also create issues for plaintiffs.
Requiring plaintiffs to post the bond far in advance of the outcome of the
litigation may be difficult for even the most well-intentioned and
honorable derivative plaintiff who is light on funds. These statutes may
impose a greater economic risk on the plaintiff rather than simply
requiring plaintiffs to pay the successful defendants’ expenses after the
final resolution of the case.54
B. MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT
The Model Business Corporation Act of 1971 (MBCA) contained a
security for expense provision that applied only to derivative suits and
required any plaintiff owning less than five percent of the outstanding
shares of any class or stock with a market value in excess of $25,000 to
“give security for the reasonable expenses.”55 This five percent threshold
is followed in seven of the current statutes.56 Over forty years later, the
$25,000 market value metric has continued in three of today’s security for
expense statutes, putting into question the value of this dollar figure as a

52. According to Professor DeMott:
The significance of security for expense statutes is that, in the cases to which they apply,
the plaintiff confronts a substantial economic risk should the defendants prevail in the
action. This risk is one that is not typically imposed on the plaintiff in the United States;
the “American” rule generally is that, with a few exceptions, both parties bear their own
litigation expenses, including, most importantly, attorney fees, and that the court does
not shift the prevailing party’s attorney fees to the nonprevailing party at the termination
of the litigation.

Id.
53.
54.
55.
56.

GALANTI, supra note 30, § 38.25.
DEMOTT, supra note 44, § 3.1.
Id.
These states are Alaska, Arkansas, Colorado, New Jersey, New York, North
Dakota, and Pennsylvania. See infra Part II.c.
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true proxy for anything about the relevant shareholders in those three
states.57
The 1971 provision did not explicitly provide for defendants other
than the corporation to move for plaintiffs to provide security; some of
the security for expense statutes do provide this, with language referring
to the corporation “or other defendant,” thereby empowering directors or
officers sued in a derivative suit to either move to demand security
themselves, or at least to empower the corporation to include the expenses
of these directors or officers in its motion for security.58
The 1971 provision provides that the amount of security can be
changed over time at the discretion of the court.59 It gives the corporation
recourse to the security upon the termination of the action, whether or not
the action was brought without reasonable cause, a concept that also
shows up in some of the current security for expense statutes.60
Most states have some statutory provisions dealing with shareholder
derivative claims against for-profit corporations. Yet, only nine states
currently have security for expense statutes.61 Eleven states have
eliminated their security for expense statutes since 1986,62 and North
Carolina added a statute for derivative suits against directors of public
corporations.63 The nine current security for expense statutes have a
number of similarities, which makes sense since they are all based in large
part on the security for expense provision in the MBCA.64 The statutes
57. These states are Arkansas, Colorado, and North Dakota. See ARK. CODE ANN. §
4-26-714(c)(1) (2018); COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-107-402(3) (2018); N.D. CENT. CODE § 1019.1-86(2) (2017).
58. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. § 49 (AM. BAR ASS’N, 1971).
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. See infra Part II.c.
62. Arizona, Florida, Hawaii, Maryland, Nebraska, New Hampshire, Tennessee,
Texas, Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. DEMOTT, supra note 44, § 3.2.
63. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-7-48(3)(2018) (stating that if a court so orders, a
plaintiff may be required to deposit a written undertaking with sufficient surety against
expenses reasonably expected to be incurred by a corporation, including expenses by way
of indemnity).
64. The language of the 1971 security for expense statute is as follows:
In any action now pending or hereafter instituted or maintained in the right of any
domestic or foreign corporation by the holder or holders of record of less than five
[percent] of the outstanding shares of any class of such corporation or of voting trust
certificates therefor[e], unless the shares or voting trust certificates so held have a
market value in excess of twenty-five thousand dollars, the corporation in whose right

2018]

SECURITY FOR EXPENSE STATUTES:
EASING SHAREHOLDER HOPELESSNESS?

47

generally allow corporations, and sometimes individual defendants, to
request that derivative plaintiffs post a bond to provide security for the
defendant corporation’s expenses, including attorney’s fees, in the event
the defendants are successful.65 Successful defendants “may have
recourse to the security if they prevail in the litigation, although some
statutes limit recourse to those cases which the court determines were
brought without reasonable cause.”66
The current version of the MBCA contains a chapter dealing with
derivative proceedings, which includes requirements for standing,67
such action is brought shall be entitled at any time before final judgment to require the
plaintiff or plaintiffs to give security for the reasonable expenses, including fees of
attorneys, that may be incurred by it in connection with such action or may be incurred
by other parties named as defendant for which it may become legally liable. Market
value shall be determined as of the date that the plaintiff institutes the action or, in the
case of an intervenor, as of the date that he becomes a party to the action. The amount
of such security may from time to time be increased or decreased, in the discretion of
the court, upon showing that the security provided has or may become inadequate or is
excessive. The corporation shall have recourse to such security in such amount as the
court having jurisdiction shall determine upon the termination of such action, whether
or not the court finds the action was brought without reasonable cause.

MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. § 49 (AM. BAR ASS’N, 1971).
65. See DEMOTT, supra note 44, § 3.2.
66. See id. § 3.1. “In several states, if the court after final judgment finds that the
action was brought ‘without reasonable cause,’ a statute authorizes the court to require
the plaintiff to pay the defendants’ reasonable expenses incurred in the defense of the
action, including the defendants’ attorneys fees.” Id. These state statutes include: ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-049(B) (1975); FLA. STAT. § 607.147(4) (repealed 1990); GA.
CODE ANN. § 14-2-123(f); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-55(e); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-19.186(1)(2017); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-11-47(B); TEX. BUS. CORP. ACT. ANN. art
5.14(J)(1)(b) (expired 2010); WASH. REV. CODE § 23A.08.460 (repealed 1990); WIS.
STAT. § 180.0746 (2) (2018).
67. The MBCA has standing requirements for derivative plaintiffs, including
contemporaneous ownership. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 7.41 (2016). A number of
states have adopted this provision and require contemporaneous ownership. See, e.g.,
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 450.1492a (2018); ME. STAT. tit. 13-C, § 752 (2018). Some states
have adopted a softer version of this, allowing the court to use its discretion to permit
suits to go forward in the absence of contemporaneous ownership. See, e.g., ALASKA
STAT. § 10.06.435 (2017); CAL. CORP. CODE § 800 (West 1982); 15 PA. CONS. STAT. §
1782 (2016). Section 7.41 also requires that derivative plaintiffs must “fairly and
adequately represent[] the interests of the corporation in enforcing the right of the
corporation.” MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 7.41 (2016). A number of state statutes require
this as well. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 450.1492a (2018); ME. STAT. tit. 13-C, § 752
(2018).
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making a demand,68 judicial stays of derivative proceedings,69 dismissal
of derivative suits,70 and discontinuance or settlement of derivative suits.71
The MBCA drops the security for expense provision and instead
authorizes the court to order payment of expenses in three different
scenarios.72 First, the court may order the corporation to pay the
successful derivative plaintiff’s expenses if it determines that the
proceedings resulted in a “substantial benefit to the corporation.”73 The
MBCA does not specifically include attorney’s fees as a repayable
expense, but neither does it specifically exclude attorney’s fees.74 The
purpose of this first scenario is to “discourage a plaintiff from proposing
inconsequential matters to justify the payment of counsel fees.”75
The second scenario is a successful defendant, in which case the
court may order the plaintiff to pay the defendant’s expenses in defending
the proceeding, if it determines that the proceeding was either commenced
or maintained “without reasonable cause” or for an “improper purpose.”76
This provision is “intended to discourage proceedings brought for the sole
purpose of obtaining early settlement payments by defendants to avoid

The introductory language of section 7.41 refers both to the commencement and
maintenance of the proceeding to make it clear that the proceeding should be dismissed
if, after commencement, the plaintiff ceases to be a shareholder or a fair and adequate
representative. The latter would occur, for example, if the plaintiff were using the
proceeding for personal advantage. If a plaintiff no longer has standing, courts have in
a number of instances provided an opportunity for one or more other shareholders to
intervene.

MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 7.41 cmt. (2016).
68. The MBCA requires all shareholders to make a written demand, to “eliminate[]
the time and expense of litigating whether demand is required.” See MODEL BUS. CORP.
ACT § 7.42 (2016); id. § 7.42 cmt.
69. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 7.43 (2016).
70. Id. § 7.44.
71. Id. § 7.45.
72. Id. § 7.46.
73. Id. § 7.46(1).
74. See id. § 7.46 (2016).
75. This provision “does not specify the method for calculating attorneys’ fees given
that there is a substantial body of case law that delineates this issue, which usually
includes taking into account the amount or character of the benefit to the corporation.”
MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 7.46 cmt. (2016).
76. Id. § 7.46(2).
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significant defense costs, while also protecting plaintiffs whose suits have
a reasonable foundation.”77
The final scenario allows the court to order either party to pay the
other’s expenses because of the filing of a pleading, motion, or other
paper if the court determines that such pleading, motion, or paper was not
“well grounded in fact” or warranted by existing law, or was “interposed
for an improper purpose,” such as harassment or delay.78 This provision
“addresses other abuses in the conduct of derivative litigation which may
occur on the part of the defendants and their counsel as well as by the
plaintiffs and their counsel. This provision may be unnecessary if these
abuses are already addressed under applicable rules of civil procedure.”79
More than forty states have general security for expense statutes that
require unsuccessful plaintiffs to pay the defendants’ costs.80 Most
include some or all of the current MBCA provisions.
C. ANALYSIS OF CURRENT SECURITY FOR EXPENSE STATUTES
Nine states currently have security for expense statutes that include
or are exclusively applicable to derivative suits. A brief description of
each statute follows, with a summary of relevant case law involving the
statutes. The case law is modest in terms of number, scope, and
significance. Early litigation found these statutory schemes
constitutional.81 The absence of robust litigation on whether and how
much bond to post may indicate that, in the years since the enactment of
the first security for expense statutes, the concept has been woven into the
fabric of the shareholder experience.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Id. § 7.46 cmt.
Id. § 7.46(3).
Id. § 7.46 cmt.
DEMOTT, supra note 44, § 3.3.
In Cohen v. Beneficial Indust. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949), the Supreme
Court held that security for expense statues do not violate either the due process or equal
protection clauses of the Constitution, although these statutes clearly can result in
different treatment for different plaintiffs, depending on their shareholdings. At least one
state case raised constitutional grounds to set aside a security for expense statute: in
Moran v. Murtaugh Miller Meyer & Nelson, LLP, 152 P. 3d 416 (Cal. 2007), the plaintiff
argued that the requirement to post such security was unconstitutional and discriminated
against the plaintiffs of “modest means.” The court rejected this contention as well, as
this would allow any security requirement statute to be held unconstitutional if a party
cannot afford to post the security.
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1. Alaska82
Alaska’s security for expense statute allows both the subject
corporation and other defendants (presumably directors and/or officers)
to move the court to require that certain derivative plaintiffs “give
security” for the reasonable expenses that such moving party or parties
might incur.83 These expenses explicitly include attorney’s fees.84 These
defendants can make this motion at any time before final judgment.85
The Alaska statute requires contemporaneous ownership by
derivative plaintiffs, absent court intervention based on the merits.86 The
statute requires a plaintiff to make a formal demand, unless grounds exist
for excusing such a demand.87 Court approval is required before a
derivative suit can be “discontinued, abandoned, compromised, or
settled.”88
Derivative plaintiffs subject to the security posting provision are
those holding less than five percent of any class of the corporation’s
stock.89 Unlike most other security for expense statutes, the Alaska statute
does not provide an alternate metric to avoid posting a bond for
stockholders owning stock in excess of some stated financial value. There
is no fixed dollar cap for the amount of the bond, which can be increased
82. ALASKA STAT. § 10.06.435(h) (2017).
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. ALASKA STAT. § 10.06.435(b) provides:
A shareholder who does not meet the requirements of this section may be allowed in
the discretion of the court to maintain the action on a preliminary showing to and
determination by the court, by motion and after a hearing at which the court considers
evidence, by affidavit or testimony, as it considers material, that:
(1) there is a strong prima facie case in favor of the claim asserted on behalf of the
corporation;
(2) no other similar action has been or is likely to be instituted;
(3) the plaintiff acquired the shares before there was disclosure to the public or to
the plaintiff of the wrongdoing of which the plaintiff complains;
(4) unless the action can be maintained the defendant may retain a gain derived
from a defendant’s wilful [sic] breach of a fiduciary duty; and
(5) the requested relief will not result in unjust enrichment of the corporation or a
shareholder of the corporation.

Id. § 10.06.435(b).
87. Id. § 10.06.435(c).
88. Id. § 10.06.435(i).
89. Id. § 10.06.435(h).
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or decreased “from time to time in the discretion of the court upon a
showing that the security has become inadequate or excessive.”90
The Alaska statute specifically provides that the court may award
reasonable expenses, including attorney’s fees, to successful plaintiffs if
“anything is received as a result of the judgment, compromise, or
settlement of that action.”91
Alaska case law flowing from the security for expense statute is
sparse. Only four Alaska cases reference the statute at all, and these courts
never discuss the security for expense requirement, other than to note that
it had not been satisfied and, thus, the suit in question should be
dismissed.92

90.
91.
92.

Id.
Id. § 10.06.435(j).
In Jerue v. Millett, 66 P.3d 736 (Alaska 2003), shareholders brought a derivative
action against directors after the state issued a certificate of involuntary dissolution. The
lower court dismissed the case as moot following the reinstatement of the corporation
and shareholders meeting, denied shareholder’s request for attorney’s fees and costs, and
awarded attorney’s fees to the directors. The shareholders did not make a pre-suit demand
and did not establish demand excusal as required by the statute. The Alaska Supreme
Court, however, did not use the security for expense statute in its analysis and instead
focused on determining who was a “prevailing party” to be awarded attorney’s fees under
Civil Rule 82. Because the shareholders failed to satisfy the statutory standard for a
derivative action, the defendant directors were deemed to be the prevailing parties but the
plaintiffs did not have to make a demand under the security for expense statute since the
derivative suit was not going forward. See also Erickson v. Wolf, No. 3AN-04-13743CI,
2008 WL 8589631 (Alaska Sept. 26, 2008) (holding that filing a derivative lawsuit
without posting the bond required based on plaintiffs’ shareholdings of less than five
percent triggered dismissal of the derivative claims but allowed the non-derivative claims
to continue). In Holmes v. Wolf, No. S–13641, 2011 WL 6046407 (Alaska Nov. 30,
2011), the court dismissed the derivative claim when the shareholders failed to file the
required bond; the case proceeded with only the shareholders’ claims against the three
directors directly. The Alaska Supreme Court did not address the Alaska security for
expense statute in its analysis. See also Ivy v. Calais Co., Inc., 2008 WL 9337985 (Alaska
Super. May 5, 2008) (dismissing plaintiff’s derivative action for failing to meet the
procedural requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Section 23.1 and the
Alaska Statute Section 10.06.435). The order did not specify which procedural
requirements were not met, but the court did allow the plaintiff an opportunity to refile.
The second amended complaint filed by plaintiff alleged that the aggrieved shareholders
owned 6.25 percent of the company’s shares and 18.75 percent of the company’s assets.
These ownership levels make it unlikely that the security for expense statute was even
part of the reasoning for dismissing the case.
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2. Arkansas93
Arkansas has a security for expense statute that allows both the
subject corporation and “any defendant” (presumably directors or
officers) to move the court to require that certain derivative plaintiffs
“furnish security”94 for probable reasonable expenses that such moving
party might incur.95 These expenses explicitly include attorney’s fees.96
The statute is silent on the timing of any such motion, other than to say
that the motion must be “upon notice and hearing.”97
The Arkansas statute requires absolute contemporaneous ownership
by derivative plaintiffs (with no provision for court intervention based on
the merits found in the Alaska and California statutes).98 The statute
permits courts, upon a finding that the action was brought “without
reasonable cause,” to require a plaintiff to pay reasonable expenses,
including attorney’s fees of the defendants;99 the statute also requires
court approval before a derivative suit can be “dismissed or
compromised.”100 The Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure carry additional
requirements for derivative proceedings, parallel to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23.1, including a requirement that plaintiffs make a formal
demand.101
Derivative plaintiffs subject to the security posting provision are
those holding less than five percent of any class of the corporation’s stock
and $25,000 or less of the corporation’s stock.102 There is no fixed dollar
cap for the amount of the bond, which can “from time to time be increased
or decreased in the discretion of the court upon a showing that the security
provided has or may become inadequate or is excessive.”103

93. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-26-714(c) (2018). The statute is superseded in part by
ARK. R. CIV. P. 23.1 Actions by Shareholders.
94. Id. § 4-26-714(c)(1).
95. Id. § 4-26-714(c)(3).
96. Id.
97. Id. § 4-26-714(c)(1).
98. Id. § 4-26-714(a).
99. Id. § 4-26-714(b).
100. Id. § 4-26-714(d).
101. ARK. R. CIV. P. 23.1.
102. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-26-714(c)(1).
103. Id. § 4-26-714(c)(7).
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The motion for security must show either (a) that there is no
“reasonable possibility” that the suit will benefit the corporation or its
security holders, or (b) that the moving party did not participate in the
transaction complained of “in any capacity.”104 Once filed, this motion
stays the proceedings until ten days after the motion has been decided.105
The statute makes it clear that failure to provide security when
ordered is fatal for the plaintiff’s case.106 The moving parties will have
access to the security “in such amount as the court shall determine upon
the termination of the action.”107
Like Alaska, Arkansas case law flowing from the security for
expense statute is sparse. No Arkansas cases even mention the security
for expense requirement.
3. California108
California’s security for expense statute allows both the subject
corporation and any other defendant, specified in the statute as an officer
or director (or former officer or director) to move the court to require
certain derivative plaintiffs to “furnish a bond” for the reasonable
expenses that such moving party might incur.109 These expenses explicitly
include attorney’s fees.110 The defendants must bring this motion within
thirty days after service of summons on the moving party.111
104. Id. § 4-26-714(c)(2). This second ground is not available to the corporation. Id.
§ 4-26-714(c)(2)(B).
105. Id. § 4-26-714(c)(9).
106. Subsection 8 says:
If the court makes a determination that security shall be furnished by the plaintiff for
the benefit of any one (1) or more defendants, the action shall be dismissed as to such
defendant unless the security required by the court shall have been furnished within
such reasonable time as may be fixed by the court.

ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-26-714(c)(8).
107. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-26-714(c)(6).
108. CAL. CORP. CODE § 800(c), (d) (West 1982). “Few statutes in California are
asked to do the kind of heavy lifting that is required of Corporations Code Section 800.
Fewer than 1,000 words in length, Section 800 represents the sum total of all legislation
on the subject of shareholder derivative litigation in California.” Charles J. Greaves, The
Unique Issues in Shareholder Derivative Litigation, L.A. LAW. 16, 16 (Dec. 2002).
109. CAL. CORP. CODE § 800(c), (d) (West 1982).
110. Id. § 800(d).
111. However, the court may, for good cause, extend this thirty-day period for an
additional period of up to sixty days. Id. § 800(c). The reality is that if a plaintiff’s bond
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The California statute requires contemporaneous ownership by a
plaintiff, absent court intervention, based on both the merits of the claim
and the plaintiff’s allegation with particularity of its efforts to get the
corporation to take the plaintiff’s desired course of action and written
notice to the corporation or board of the cause of action.112
The motion for security must show either (a) there is no “reasonable
possibility” that the suit will benefit the corporation or its shareholders,
or (b) that the moving party did not participate in the complained of
transaction “in any capacity.”113 Filing this motion stays the proceedings
until ten days after the motion has been decided.114
The statute makes it clear that a ruling by the court on the motion for
security “shall not be a determination of any issue in the action or of the
merits thereof.”115 Despite this language, if the motion for security is
granted, it likely ends the lawsuit. Why would any rational derivative
plaintiff agree to post $50,000 after the court decided the suit indicated
that either there is no reasonable possibility of success or that the
defendant was not involved in the complained-of act in any capacity?116
Unlike most other security for expense statutes, the California statute
does not require court approval for a derivative suit to be settled. In
addition, there is no statutory threshold amount of stock that must be held
by plaintiffs to satisfy the California statute. Rather, the court has
discretion to require any plaintiff to provide security.117 If the motion is
granted, the court will establish the amount of security for reasonable
is sought in a shareholder derivative action, it is likely because “the corporation’s board
of directors has, in response to the plaintiff’s demand, already determined that
prosecution of the action is not in the best interests of the corporation.” Greaves, supra
note 108, at 17. See Davis Family Capital Partners, Inc. v. Comte, No. G046254, 2013
Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 2213 (Mar. 26, 2013). In Davis, the plaintiffs filed a derivative
action. The trial court ordered the plaintiffs to post a bond of $50,000, and subsequently
dismissed their complaint. The plaintiffs argued that the motion to require the bond was
filed over seven months after the original complaint, far exceeding the thirty-day limit,
and was thus untimely. The court rejected this argument, however, because the second
amended complaint was filed one month before the defendants’ motion for the security
for expense and therefore was considered to be timely.
112. CAL. CORP. CODE § 800(b) (West 1982).
113. Id. § 800(c). This second ground is not available to the corporation. Id.
114. Id. § 800(f).
115. Id. § 800(d).
116. See Greaves, supra note 108, at 17.
117. CAL. CORP. CODE § 800(d) (West 1982).
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expenses, including attorney’s fees, not to exceed $50,000.118 This
threshold is an aggregate and the court cannot require a greater bond, even
if there are multiple defendants or causes of action.119
California courts have noted that a goal of this statute is “to give the
corporation security against groundless suits on the part of
shareholders”120 and to “prevent unwarranted shareholder derivative
lawsuits.”121 California courts have provided guidance with respect to the
scope and meaning of this statute.122 Several of the main issues are
discussed below.
a. Can a California Derivative Plaintiff Be Required to Furnish $50,000
in Security for Each of Multiple Defendants?
The statutory aggregate of $50,000 is the total amount one derivative
plaintiff can be required to post, regardless of the number of individual
defendants.123 The statute uses the word “aggregate” when referencing the
required bond: derivative plaintiffs must “furnish a bond in the aggregate
amount of fifty thousand dollars ($50,000) to secure the reasonable
expenses of the parties.”124 However, the literal wording of the statute
does not clearly indicate that this is the total for any and all defendants,
collectively. Defendants have argued that, as a result, an ambiguity exists
about whether the $50,000 is a cap per defendant or if it is a cap on the
total amount the derivative plaintiff can be asked to furnish.125
In Hale v. Southern California IPA Medical Group, Inc.,126 the
derivative plaintiff sued the defendant corporation and its individual
directors. Each defendant moved for the plaintiff to post bond pursuant to
118.
119.

Id.
Hale v. S. Cal. IPA Med. Grp., Inc., 103 Cal. Rptr. 2d 773, 778 (Cal. Ct. App.

2001).
120. Barber v. Lewis & Kaufman, Inc., 269 P.2d 929, 931 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1954).
121. Donner Mgmt. Co. v. Schaffer, 48 Cal. Rptr. 3d 534, 538 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006).
122. “Because the statutory scheme governing shareholder derivative actions in
California is skeletal, and because these actions are equitable in nature, the courts have
played a prominent role in shaping the substantive law and procedure in this area.”
Greaves, supra note 108, at 18.
123. CAL. CORP. CODE § 800(d) (West 1982).
124. Id. § 800(e).
125. See Hale v. S. Cal. IPA Med. Grp., Inc., 103 Cal. Rptr. 2d 773, 774 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2001).
126. Id.
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Section 800, and the trial court held that the plaintiff was required to
furnish security for each defendant, totaling a bond of $250,000.127
According to the defendants, the “underlying public policy manifest by
Corporations Code Section 800 is to discourage frivolous shareholder
derivative litigation . . . Placing an artificial ceiling of an aggregate totally
ignores the underlying purpose of the statute and adds the word
‘aggregate’ where the legislature pointedly deleted it.”128 When the
plaintiff failed to post the $250,000 bond, the trial court dismissed the
case, and the plaintiff appealed.129 The court found ambiguity in the
statute in that subdivision (d) is silent on whether the language “not to
exceed fifty thousand dollars” is applicable to each individual defendant
or if it applies to the maximum amount without regard to the number of
defendants.130 The court looked to the wording of subdivision (e) “in the
aggregate amount of fifty thousand dollars,”131 which the court interpreted
to mean that a bond of $50,000 fully satisfies the plaintiff’s statutory
obligation.132 The court supported its interpretation by noting that
“absurdity could result” if plaintiffs were required to post up to $50,000
in security for each defendant in a derivative suit.133 Moreover, the court
found that the legislative history of the most recent amendment to Section
800, which removed an explicit cap in subdivision (d), was not intended
to be a substantive change to that provision.134 A comment to the
amendment reading “[t]he other changes in Section 800 are technical”
further supported the court’s contention that the maximum amount of
bond security to be posted is $50,000, even though subdivision (d) does
not explicitly say so.135 Thus, the court overturned the dismissal for the
plaintiff’s failure to post the $250,000 bond because it exceeded the
statutory maximum of an aggregate of $50,000.

127.
128.

Id. at 774.
Ruling Guts State Bond Law, Directors Tell California High Court, 16 No. 14
ANDREWS CORP. OFF. & DIRECTORS LIAB. LITIG. REP. 5 (April 23, 2001).
129. Hale, 103 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 774.
130. Id. at 775.
131. CAL. CORP. CODE § 800(e) (West 1982).
132. Hale, 103 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 775.
133. Id. at 776.
134. Id. at 777-78.
135. Id. at 778.
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b. Is the $50,000 Aggregate Maximum Security Also a Limit on Total
Liability for Defendant Expenses Payable by Derivative Plaintiffs?
The $50,000 figure in the statute is both the maximum bond a
derivative shareholder can be required to post and also the maximum
liability such shareholder will accrue, regardless of the actual expenses of
a successful defendant or defendants.
In West Hills Farms, Inc. v. RCO Ag Credit, Inc.,136 a derivative
plaintiff was required to, and furnished, a $50,000 bond, but eventually
lost the case because it could not prove demand futility. The successful
defendant corporation wanted payment from the plaintiff of all of its
reasonable expenses and attorney’s fees, regardless of the amount of the
plaintiff’s bond.137 The appellate court noted the essential purpose of the
statute as “a deterrent to unwarranted shareholder derivative lawsuits.”138
Moreover, the court pointed out that Section 800(d) expressly limits, in
plain language, the amount of the bond to be posted at $50,000 to cover
litigation expenses incurred by the defendant.139 The court distinguished
Section 800, a “bond or security statute,” from an “open-ended attorney
fee liability statute,” noting that the former defines the particular relief
available.140 It also explains that the statute makes no mention of
attorney’s fees except in subdivision (d) which is limited in context to
what the bond is intended to cover.141 The appellate court found nothing
in the language of the statute to support the notion that it was “intended
to create an independent basis for recovery . . . apart from recourse to the
bond.”142 The court then analyzed the relevant case law and found it to be
in agreement with the premise that Section 800 was a security for expense
statute and not a liability statute, which means the only recourse available
is the amount of the bond, if one was posted.143 The court therefore
refused to write into the statute something that was not there and

136. 88 Cal. Rptr. 3d 458 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009) (quoting Donner Mgmt. Co. v.
Schaffer, 48 Cal. Rptr. 3d 534, 540 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006)).
137. Id. at 459.
138. Id. at 461.
139. Id. at 460.
140. Id. at 462.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 463-64.
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confirmed the trial court’s finding that the defendant was only entitled to
the amount of the bond posted by the plaintiffs.144
c. What Are the Ramifications of a Derivative Plaintiff Voluntarily
Posting Bond Under Section 800(e)?
Once a derivative plaintiff voluntarily posts bond, defendants have
no responsibilities under the statute. That said, the California courts
explore whether the derivative plaintiff is the “prevailing party.”145
Voluntarily posting bond does not absolve the derivative plaintiff from
the other statutory responsibilities like contemporaneous ownership or
making the required demand.146
Section 800(e) authorizes derivative plaintiffs to voluntarily post
bond before the court orders them to do so:
(e) If the plaintiff shall, either before or after a motion is made
pursuant to subdivision (c), or any order or determination pursuant to
the motion, furnish a bond in the aggregate amount of fifty thousand
dollars ($50,000) to secure the reasonable expenses of the parties
entitled to make the motion, the plaintiff has complied with the
requirements of this section and with any order for a bond therefore
made, and any such motion then pending shall be dismissed and no
further or additional bond shall be required.147

Plaintiffs who choose to get ahead of a court order to post bond may
do so for strategic reasons, such as avoiding a delay in the litigation
because of court proceedings on the bond issue since Section 800(f)
provides that if a defendant moves to require a bond, the prosecution of
the action “shall be stayed until ten days after the motion has been
disposed of.”148
In Donner Management Company v. Schaffer, the derivative plaintiff
voluntarily posted a $50,000 bond to avoid a discovery stay.149 After the

144.
145.

Id. at 464.
See, e.g., Donner Mgmt. Co. v. Schaffer, 48 Cal. Rptr. 3d 534, 535 (Cal. Ct. App.
2006) (holding that the defendant was the “prevailing party for purposes of an attorney
fees award based on the security”).
146. Id. at 541.
147. CAL. CORP. CODE § 800(e) (West 1982).
148. Id. § 800(f).
149. 48 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 536.
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defendant’s special litigation committee found that going to trial would
be detrimental to the company, the plaintiff moved for a motion to dismiss
without prejudice, which was granted.150 One of the defendants moved for
attorney fees to be paid from the $50,000 bond posted by the plaintiff.151
The trial court awarded the fees because it determined that this defendant
was a “prevailing party.”152 Since the statute does not use or define the
term “prevailing party,” California courts have avoided using a “rigid
definition” and left the decision up to the trial courts to determine whether
a party has prevailed “on a practical level.”153 Because the special
litigation committee found that the lawsuit would not be successful, the
trial court exercised appropriate discretion to determine the defendants

150.
151.
152.
153.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 535.
Id. at 542. In Anderson v. Ingargiola, a derivative plaintiff voluntarily posted a
$50,000 security bond. No. A112267, 2006 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 6764, at *2-3 (Cal
Ct. App. Aug. 3, 2006). A year later, the parties settled the matter, with the court entering
a judgment against the defendants, in favor of the plaintiff. Id. The settlement order
included a $50,000 award to the plaintiff, but the plaintiff was not permitted to recover
fees and costs. Id. at *3-4. After the settlement was entered, defendants moved to enforce
liability on the security bond because the plaintiff recovered personally and no benefit
was given to the corporation or shareholders. The plaintiff filed a “Satisfaction of Debt
and Release” stating that the $50,000 award was considered satisfied and there were no
further obligations of the defendants. Id. at *4. The trial court granted the defendants’
motion to enforce liability on the bond because the plaintiff could not have obtained
judgment on the derivative cause of action, thus finding defendants were entitled to
recovery of the bond pursuant to Section 800 even when they were not the prevailing
party. Id. at *4. The appellate court affirmed, analyzing what it means to be a “prevailing
party” when the plaintiff technically prevails but the suit brings no benefit to the
corporation or its shareholders. Id. at *5-6. The court also stated that prevailing
defendants are entitled to enforce a bond, but that prevailing plaintiffs may not always be
able to avoid enforcement of the bond. Id. The parties’ decision to settle, according to the
court, was one of temporal resolution and not an “adjudication of either liability or
damages.” Id. at *7. Moreover, the fact that a judgment was entered did not establish that
the plaintiff’s allegations had validity to qualify one party as prevailing over the other.
Id. The court went on to point out that even if the settlement exposed any kind of liability,
which it did not, it would only be liable to the plaintiff individually and not to the
corporation or shareholders. Id. at *6-8. Therefore, since no liability from the cause of
action was imposed by the settlement, the defendants’ motion to enforce the bond was
allowed. Id. at *6-8, *11.
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were the prevailing party and, thus, were entitled to the attorney fees out
of the bond posted by the plaintiff.154
The plaintiff argued that fees should not be awarded until after it has
been determined there was no reasonable possibility the lawsuit would
benefit the corporation, as required by Section 800(c)(1).155 The court
found that when a plaintiff voluntarily posts security, as the plaintiff did
here, a defendant need not make any further showing to collect beyond
being a prevailing party.156 Here specifically, the defendant did not need
to make the showing that there is no reasonable possibility of benefit to
the corporation.157
The court also acknowledged that it would be awkward to address
the reasonableness issue at the close of litigation, because the decision
about whether the litigation benefits the corporation is effectively made
when the case is over or dismissed, as it was in this case.158
In Shields v. Singleton, the derivative plaintiff voluntarily posted the
$50,000 security bond but the trial court ruled that the plaintiff failed to
make the required demand.159 The plaintiff appealed, arguing that
voluntarily posting the bond somehow obviated the demand
requirement.160 The plaintiff argued that the statute’s use of “section” as
opposed to “subdivision” or “subsection” meant the legislature intended
a voluntary bond to essentially remove the standing requirements in
Section 800(b).161 The court looked to the California legislature’s
revisions of Section 800, along with its predecessor, and determined the
use of “section” instead of “subsection” was not intended to change the
purpose of the statute, which was to “facilitate the prosecution of
legitimate derivative claims.”162

154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

Donner Mgmt. Co., 48 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 543.
Id. at 537.
Id. at 539.
Id. at 541.
Id. at 540-41 (emphasis added).
19 Cal. Rptr. 2d 459, 462-63 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993).
Id. at 463.
Id. at 463-64.
Id. at 464-65.
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d. Does a California Derivative Plaintiff Have to Pay the Defendants’
Costs if No Bond is Ever Posted?
In Alcott v. M. E. V. Corporation, the derivative plaintiff
unsuccessfully sued the defendant corporation and individual
defendants.163 The defendants never sought security to be posted pursuant
to Section 800, but attorney’s fees were awarded to them.164 The trial court
awarded the requested fees and the plaintiffs appealed, arguing that
attorney’s fees cannot be awarded under Section 800 when no security
bond was posted by the plaintiff.165
The appellate court agreed with the plaintiff and rejected the
defendant’s argument that an amendment to Section 800 in 1982
“transmuted” a security statute into a liability statute; because no security
was posted, the plaintiffs are not responsible for the fees, at least pursuant
to Section 800.166
4. Colorado167
Colorado’s security for expense statute allows the subject
corporation to move the court to require certain derivative plaintiffs to
“give security for the costs and reasonable expenses” that such moving
party might incur.168 These moving parties may include “other parties
named as defendant.”169 These expenses explicitly exclude attorney’s
fees.170 This motion may be brought at any time before final judgment.171
The Colorado statute requires contemporaneous ownership by a
plaintiff (with no provision for court intervention based on the merits
found in the Alaska and California statutes).172 The Colorado Rules of
Civil Procedure add additional requirements for derivative proceedings,

163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.

238 Cal. Rptr. 520, 521 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987).
Id. at 521-22.
Id.
Id.
COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-107-402(3) (1994).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. § 7-107-402(1).
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paralleling Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.1, including the
requirement that a plaintiff make a formal demand.173
Derivative plaintiffs subject to the security posting provision are
those holding less than five percent of any class of the corporation’s stock
and $25,000 or less of the corporation’s stock.174 There is no fixed dollar
cap for the amount of the bond, which can be “from time to time . . .
increased or decreased, in the discretion of the court, upon showing that
the security provided has or may become inadequate or is excessive.”175
Unlike other security for expense statutes, the Colorado statute does not
require court approval for a derivative suit to be settled.176
Unlike the California statute, the Colorado statute provides that if the
court determines that the derivative “action was commenced without
reasonable cause,” the corporation shall have recourse to the security
upon termination of the action.177 If the “costs and expenses exceed the
amount of the bond or if no bond is posted,” the derivative plaintiff must
“pay the costs and reasonable expenses directly attributable to the
defense” of the derivative suit, excluding attorney’s fees.178
No Colorado case law discusses the security for expense statutes.
5. Nevada179
Nevada’s security for expense statute allows both the subject
corporation and any other defendant, specified in the statute as an officer,
director, or former officer or director, to move the court to require certain
derivative plaintiffs to “furnish security” for the reasonable expenses that
such moving party might incur.180 These expenses explicitly include
attorney’s fees.181 Like the California statute, the Nevada statute requires

173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.

See FED. R. CIV. P. 23.1(b)(3); COLO. R. CIV. P. 23.1.
COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-107-402(3).
Id.
See generally COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-107-402.
Id. § 7-107-402(3).
Jolyn J. Moses, Shareholders’ Derivative Action, in 1 COLO. PRACTICE,
METHODS OF PRACTICE § 2:66 (7th ed. 2018).
179. NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.520 (1997).
180. Id. § 41.520(3)-(4).
181. Id. § 41.520(4)(b).
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that this motion be brought within thirty days after service of a summons
on the moving party.182
The Nevada statute requires absolute contemporaneous ownership
by a plaintiff (with no provision for court intervention based on the merits
found in the Alaska and California statutes).183 The Nevada statute and
the Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure add additional requirements for
derivative proceedings, paralleling Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.1,
including a requirement that the plaintiff make a formal demand.184
Similar to the California statute, the Nevada statute does not provide
a threshold amount of stock that must be held by plaintiffs to satisfy the
statute and avoid posting security.185 Rather, the court has discretion to
require any plaintiff to provide security.186 If the motion is granted, the
court will establish the amount of security for reasonable expenses, but
without a cap as provided in the California statute.187
As in the California statute, under the Nevada statute, the motion for
security must show either (a) “[t]hat there is no reasonable possibility that
the . . . [suit] will benefit the corporation or its security holders,”188 or (b)
“[t]hat the moving party . . . did not participate in the transaction
complained of in any capacity.”189 Filing this motion stays the
proceedings until ten days after the motion has been decided.190
If a court determines after a hearing that the moving party established
a probability in support of either of the statutory grounds, the court
decides “the nature and amount of security to be furnished by the plaintiff
for reasonable expenses, including attorney’s fees . . . ”191 The amount of
security can be increased or decreased by the court’s discretion upon a
showing that the security provided “has or may become inadequate or is

182. Id. § 41.520(3). However, as in the California statute, the court may, for good
cause, extend this thirty-day period for an additional period of up to sixty days. Id.
183. Id. § 41.520(2).
184. Id.; NEV. R. CIV. P. 23.1; see FED. R. CIV. P. 23.1(b)(3). Like the Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 23.1(b)(3), the Nevada statute also requires derivative plaintiffs to make
a demand. NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.520(2).
185. NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.520.
186. Id. § 41.520(3).
187. Compare id. § 41.520(4)(b), with CAL. CORP. CODE § 800(d) (West 1982).
188. Id. § 41.520(3)(a).
189. Id. § 41.520(3). This second ground is not available to the corporation. Id.
190. Id. § 41.520(5).
191. Id. § 41.520(4)(b).
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excessive.”192 The statute makes it clear that failure to provide security
when ordered is fatal to a plaintiff’s case.193
The corporation and the moving party may have recourse to the
security upon termination of the action.194 The statute makes it clear that
a ruling by the court on the motion for security “shall not be deemed a
determination of any one or more issues in the action or of the merits
thereof.”195 Unlike most other security for expense statutes, the Nevada
statute does not require court approval for a derivative suit to be settled.
Only one case has addressed the Nevada statute.196 In In re Cook, the
derivative plaintiffs filed a motion to dismiss the derivative claims.197 The
defendant objected, not necessarily to the claims being dismissed, but
instead contended that the plaintiffs should be required to post bond
pursuant to the Nevada statute to cover the defendant’s attorney’s fees.198
The court declined to require a bond and acknowledged that, under the
terms of the statute, the bond is not an automatic right and requires a court
to make certain determinations before ordering such security to be
posted.199 Here, the plaintiffs moved for dismissal before any such
demand for security was made, thus, before the hearing required by the
statute to determine if the bond should be ordered, and if so, how much.200
The court then determined that Section 41.520(2) is applicable to
derivative suits only, and once such a suit is dismissed, the statute no
longer applies.201
6. New Jersey202
New Jersey has a security for expense statute that allows the subject
corporation to move the court to require certain derivative plaintiffs to
“give security for the reasonable expenses” that such moving party might
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
In re Cook, 444 B.R. 207 (Bankr. D.N.M. 2011).
Id. at 208.
Id. at 208-10.
Id. at 209.
Id.
Id. at 209-10.
N.J. REV. STAT. § 14A:3-6.8 (2013).
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incur.203 These other parties may include “other parties named as
defendant.”204 Under the statute, expenses explicitly include attorney’s
fees.205 This motion may be brought at any time before final judgment.206
The New Jersey statute requires absolute contemporaneous
ownership by a plaintiff (with no provision for court intervention based
on the merits, as found in the Alaska and California statutes).207 And
derivative plaintiffs must “fairly and adequately represent [] the interests
of the corporation” in the action208 and must make a formal demand.209
Before a derivative suit can be “discontinued or settled,” court approval
is required.210
Derivative plaintiffs subject to the security posting provision are
those holding less than five percent of any class of the corporation’s stock
and $250,000 or less of the corporation’s stock.211 There is no fixed dollar
cap for the amount of the bond.212
Upon termination of the suit, the court can order the corporation to
pay the plaintiffs’ expenses if it finds that the derivative proceeding
resulted in a “substantial benefit” to the corporation.213 If the court finds
that the suit was commenced or maintained without the exercise of
“reasonable diligence by the plaintiff, or without reasonable cause or for
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See ALASKA STAT. § 10.06.435(B) (1989); CAL. CORP. CODE § 800(b)(1) (West
1982); N.J. REV. STAT. § 14A:3-6.2 (2013). According to the Senate Commerce
Committee Statement:
Current law provides that a shareholder cannot commence a derivative proceeding
unless the shareholder was a shareholder of the corporation at the time of the act or
omission complained of or became a shareholder through transfer by operation of law
from one who was a shareholder at that time. The bill retains this requirement and adds
to it the requirement that the shareholder remain a shareholder throughout the derivative
proceeding. The bill also provides that a shareholder may not maintain a derivative
proceeding unless the suit fairly and adequately represents the interests of the
corporation in enforcing the right of the corporation.

S. Commerce Comm. Statement, Senate Bill, No. 2326-L.2013, Jan. 14, 2013.
208. N.J. REV. STAT. § 14A:3-6.2 (2013).
209. Id. § 14A:3-6.3.
210. Id. § 14A:3-6.6.
211. Id. § 14A:3-6.8.
212. See generally id. § 14A:3.
213. Id. § 14A:3-6.7(1).
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an improper purpose,” the court can order the plaintiff to pay the
defendant’s expenses in defending the proceeding.214 Unlike the
California statute, which has a ceiling dollar amount, the New Jersey
statute allows for the full amount of such expenses to be paid.215 And
finally, the court can order either party to pay the other’s expenses for
filing pleadings, motions, or other papers frivolously.216
No New Jersey cases explore the security for expense process.
7. New York217
New York’s security for expense statute allows the subject
corporation to move the court to require certain derivative plaintiffs to
“give security for the reasonable expenses” that the corporation might
incur.218 The statute permits the corporation to request a bond on behalf
of “the other parties [sic] defendant,” presumably officers and directors,
to cover any fees “for which the corporation may become liable under this
chapter, under any contract or otherwise under law . . . ”219 These expenses
explicitly include attorney’s fees.220 This motion may be brought at any
time before final judgment.221
The New York statute requires contemporaneous ownership by a
plaintiff (with no provision for court intervention based on the merits, as
found in the Alaska and California statutes).222 Derivative plaintiffs must

214.
215.

Id. § 14A:3-6.7(2)-(3).
Compare CAL. CORP. CODE § 800(d) (West 1982), with N.J. REV. STAT. § 14A:36.7 (2013).
216. The statute provides that the court may:
(3) order a party to pay an opposing party’s expenses incurred because of the filing of
a pleading, motion or other paper, if it finds that the pleading, motion or other paper
was not well grounded in fact, after reasonable inquiry, or warranted by existing law or
a good faith argument for the extension, modification or reversal of existing law and
was interposed for an improper purpose, such as to harass or cause unnecessary delay
or needlessly increase the cost of litigation.
N.J. REV. STAT. § 14A:3-6.7(3) (2013).
217. N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 627 (McKinney 2018).
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 626(b) (McKinney 2018); see also ALASKA STAT. §

10.06.435(b) (1989); CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 800(b)(1), (b)(2) (West 1982).
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make a formal demand.223 Court approval is required before a derivative
suit can be “discontinued, compromised or settled.”224
Derivative plaintiffs subject to the security posting provision are
those holding less than five percent of any class of the corporation’s stock
and $50,000 or less of the corporation’s stock.225 There is no fixed dollar
cap for the amount of the bond, which can be increased or decreased from
time to time, “in the discretion of the court having jurisdiction of such
action upon showing that the security provided has or may become
inadequate or excessive.”226
Upon termination of the suit, the corporation shall have recourse to
the security posted “in such amount as the court having jurisdiction of
such action shall determine . . . ”227
New York courts have noted that a goal of the five percent ownership
threshold is to protect corporations from the “abuse of derivative actions
instituted by stockholders having small or minuscule interests in a large
corporation” since “stockholder[s] motivated by personal gain instead of
the welfare of the corporation” would be deterred by the threshold from
bringing a frivolous action.228 New York courts have provided guidance
with respect to the scope and meaning of this statute.229
a. When is it Too Late for Defendants to Move for Security?
The language of the statute permits this motion to be brought “at any
stage of the proceedings before final judgment.”230 In interpreting this
language, courts have held that “the corporation’s entitlement to security
for the reasonable expenses incurred in the action terminates with the
entry of a final judgment.”231 In Shapiro v. Rockville Country Club, Inc.,
the defendants moved for plaintiff to post bond, but the action was
dismissed before any judicial determination, since the defendant board’s
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.

2005).

N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 626(c).
Id. § 626(d).
Id. § 627.
Id.
Id.
Roach v. Franchises Int’l, Inc., 300 N.Y.S.2d 630, 633 (N.Y. App. Div. 1969).
See id. at 633-34.
N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 627.
Shapiro v. Rockville Country Club, Inc., 802 N.Y.S.2d 717, 720 (N.Y. App. Div.
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decisions were found to be reasonable.232 The defendants, however, made
a motion for leave to renew the prior motion regarding the posting of bond
by the plaintiff after the dismissals, which the plaintiff appealed.233 The
court interpreted the language of Section 627 to clearly mean “the
corporation’s entitlement to security for the reasonable expenses incurred
in the action terminates with the entry of a final judgment.”234 The court
then entered final judgment in the defendant’s favor before the
defendant’s motion to renew the bond.235
b. When Does the Court Calculate the Five Percent Ownership Stake: At
“Any Stage of the Proceeding?”
New York courts have made clear that the calculation of ownership
for purposes of the security for expense requirement cannot be done after
the suit is filed, and thus must be made at the time the derivative suit is
filed.236 This makes implicit sense, and also should foreclose
opportunistic behavior by defendant corporations issuing stock simply to
trigger a security for expense for derivative plaintiffs. The timing
requirement should also foreclose efforts by plaintiffs to buy more stock
after filing the derivative suit to avoid posting a bond.
There is no New York case law in which a court considers decrease
in stock ownership after the filing of the derivative suit for the purpose of
Section 627. The reverse is true as well; if plaintiff is below five percent
when filing the complaint, subsequent stock acquisition during the
pendency of the suit will not discharge the obligation to post security.237
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.

Id. at 719-20.
Id.
Id. at 720.
Id. at 719-20.
See, e.g., Tyler v. Gas Consumers Association, 229 N.Y.S.2d 169, 170-71 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1962) (granting the corporate defendant’s cross motion to dismiss for plaintiff’s
failure to fulfill the terms of the order for security on the basis that he personally acquired
additional shares after commencement of the action and after the order for security was
entered).
237. See Haberman v. Tobin, 626 F.2d 1101, 1104 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding that the
acquisition of stock over the statutory threshold after the commencement of a shareholder
derivative action is insufficient to avoid security for expense under Section 627); see also
Tyler, 229 N.Y.S.2d at 170-71 (holding that plaintiff failed to fulfill the terms of the
court’s order for security on the basis that he acquired additional stock after the action
was commenced).
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In Roach v. Franchises International, Inc.,238 the derivative plaintiff
owned more than five percent of the defendant corporation’s stock when
the suit was filed. Thereafter, the corporation issued more stock,
purportedly to raise money for operating expenses to retire a bank loan.239
The plaintiff did not buy any of the new stock, claiming that the additional
stock issuance was undertaken instead to win the bond motion by diluting
the plaintiff below the five percent threshold to post bond.240 The
defendants argued that the statutory language permitting the motion for
security to be brought “at any stage of the proceedings before final
judgment” somehow also applies to the minimum ownership threshold
necessary to avoid security for expense.241 The court rejected this
contention and interpreted that the language does nothing more than
“permit the making of the application for security by the corporation at
any time before judgment and is not an inflexible direction . . . ”242
Therefore, the plaintiffs, at the time the action commenced, satisfied the
statutory threshold and the motion for security for expense was correctly
denied.243
Dingle v. Xtenit, Inc.244 provides a similar scenario and result. The
minority shareholder plaintiff brought a shareholder derivative action
while owning five percent or more of the defendant’s stock. The
defendant responded by increasing its outstanding common stock from
10,000,000 shares to 500,000,000 shares, offering the new shares to
officers and future employees of the corporation, excluding, of course, the
plaintiff.245 The defendant then filed a motion to dismiss, on grounds that
included plaintiff’s failure to post the required bond.246 The court rejected
the defendant’s argument that the plaintiff needed to post a bond, because
the actions outlined in the complaint were the very actions that caused the
plaintiff’s ownership percentage to drop below the five percent
threshold.247 The court felt that this alone was enough to demonstrate that
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.

Roach v. Franchises Int’l, Inc., 300 N.Y.S.2d 630, 631 (N.Y. App. Div. 1969).
Id.
Id. at 631-32.
Id. at 632-33 (internal citation omitted).
Id. at 634.
Id. at 635-36.
2008 N.Y. Slip Op. 51587(U) (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2008).
Id. at *1.
Id. at *2-3.
Id. at *5.
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the suit was not a “baseless strike suit[]” to serve the interests of a
minority shareholder, as opposed to the interest of the company.248 The
court cited case law that did not require the plaintiffs to post bond when
their ownership interest was originally over the statutory threshold and
was only diluted, during the pendency of the proceeding, as a result of an
act by the corporation.249 Since the plaintiff owned fifteen percent at the
time of the complaint, no bond was required to be posted.250
c. Can Derivative Plaintiffs Aggregate Ownership to Get Over the Five
Percent Threshold?
The statute is silent on this issue, but courts have opined that the
language in the statute “unless the plaintiff or plaintiffs hold five percent
or more” allows for plaintiffs to aggregate their shares with intervenors.251
But the aggregation must be done before the lawsuit is filed so that the
plaintiffs “hold” the necessary stock ownership when filing the derivative
complaint.252
In Miller v. Victor,253 after the defendant moved for security for
expense, the plaintiff joined another shareholder as an additional party so
their combined interests would be above the five percent statutory
minimum. The court found this action to be too late to prevent the security
for expense requirement.254

248.
249.
250.
251.

Id.
Id.
Id.
See, e.g., Miller v. Victor, No. 14-cv-1819 (PKC), 2015 WL 892276, at *1-2
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 2, 2015).
252. Id. at *2. According to Professor DeMott:
The problems raised by aggregation stem from the interplay between the
contemporaneous ownership requirement and the exemption provisions in security for
expense statutes. The plaintiff, in order to satisfy the contemporaneous ownership rule,
must have owned some shares in the company as of the time of the occurrence of the
wrong alleged in the suit; to be exempt from the security for expense requirements, the
original plaintiff and any intervenors must own shares in excess of the threshold amount
or percentage set by the statute. The problem is whether the purpose of the
contemporaneous ownership rule is frustrated if the plaintiff can be exempted from the
security requirements by acquiring shares after the time of the wrong alleged in the suit.

DEMOTT, supra note 44, § 3:9.
253. Miller, 2015 WL 892276, at *1.
254. Id. at *3.
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8. North Dakota255
North Dakota’s security for expense statute allows the subject
corporation to move the court to require that certain derivative plaintiffs
“give security for the reasonable expenses” that such moving party might
incur.256 These expenses explicitly include attorney’s fees.257 This motion
may be brought at any time before final judgment.258
The North Dakota statute requires contemporaneous ownership by a
plaintiff (with no provision for court intervention based on the merits, as
found in the Alaska and California statutes).259
Derivative plaintiffs subject to the security posting provision are
those holding less than five percent of any class of the corporation’s stock
and $25,000 or less of the corporation’s stock.260 There is no fixed dollar
cap for the amount of the bond.261
Upon termination of the suit, the court can order the plaintiff to pay
the corporation’s expenses if it finds that the derivative proceeding was
brought “without reasonable cause.”262 Unlike the California statute that
has a ceiling dollar amount, the North Dakota statute allows for the full
amount of such expenses to be paid.263 The corporation may have recourse
to the security upon termination of the action.264
No North Dakota cases explore the security for expense process.
9. Pennsylvania265
Pennsylvania’s security for expense statute allows the subject
corporation to move the court to require that certain derivative plaintiffs
“give security for the reasonable expenses” that the corporation might

255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.

N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-19.1-86(2) (1997).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. § 10-19.1-86.
Id. § 10-19.1-86(2).
Id. § 10-19.1-86(2)(b).
Id. § 10-19.1-86(1).
Id.; see also CAL. CORP. CODE § 800(d) (West 1982).
N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-19.1-86(2)(c).
15 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1782 (2016).
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incur.266 These expenses explicitly include attorney’s fees.267 This motion
may be brought at any stage of the proceeding.268
The Pennsylvania statute requires contemporaneous ownership by a
plaintiff or the showing of “a strong prima facie case in favor of the claim
asserted on behalf of the corporation and that without the action serious
injustice will result.”269 Derivative plaintiffs must make a formal demand,
unless such a demand is excused.270 Court approval is required before a
derivative suit can be “dismissed or compromised”271
Derivative plaintiffs subjected to the security posting provision must
hold less than five percent of any class of the corporation’s stock and
$200,000 or less of the corporation’s stock.272 There is no fixed dollar cap
for the amount of the bond, which can be increased or decreased from
time to time, “in the discretion of the court upon showing that the security
provided has or is likely to become inadequate or excessive.”273
Pennsylvania is unique among the nine statutes, in that it provides a
financial hardship exception where security may be denied or limited
under the court’s discretion if the security requirement imposes undue
hardship on plaintiffs and serious injustice would result.274 Further, a
successful plaintiff may be awarded its reasonable expenses, including
attorney’s fees and costs, capped at “a reasonable proportion of the value
of the relief obtained by plaintiff.”275
III. RECOMMENDATIONS
Broader questions exist as to the value and efficacy of derivative
litigation as a vehicle for corporate good that are well beyond the scope
of this Article.276 For shareholders bound by one of the nine security for
266. Id. § 1782(c).
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. Id. § 1782(b).
270. Id. § 1781(a)(1)-(2).
271. 231 PA. CODE § 1506(d) (1991).
272. 15 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1782(c) (2016).
273. Id.
274. Id. § 1782(b).
275. Id. § 1784(b).
276. As described in the introductory comment to the MBCA:
A great deal of controversy has surrounded the derivative suit, and widely different
perceptions as to the value and efficacy of this litigation continue to exist. On the one
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expense statutes, posting a bond may not be the only option. As discussed
above, like-minded shareholders can join together and aggregate their
stock ownership to five percent or more of at least one class of the subject
corporation’s stock before filing the derivative suit.277 One challenge
posed by this idea may arise if the shareholder is not able to access the
shareholder list to reach potential co-plaintiffs because of a lack of
sufficient stockholding to satisfy any threshold requirement for inspection
rights.
Another circumvention method could include a federal cause of
action along with the state-law based derivative claim. In federal courts,
there is no general federal security for expense statute for derivative
actions, although one federal securities law touches on the concept of
direct litigation.278 Security for expense statutes may have the unintended
effect of encouraging plaintiffs to couch their claims under these
securities laws, which may not be the truest legal claim based on the facts.
But for derivative plaintiffs in the nine states previously discussed
who cannot avoid the security for expense statute and must choose
between posting a bond that the court thinks is appropriate or failing to
pursue the claim, the question remains whether such shareholders are
actually better off generally. Do these nine security for expense statutes
offer shareholders real options other than voting current management out

hand, the derivative suit has historically been the principal method of challenging
allegedly illegal action by management. On the other hand, it has long been recognized
that the derivative suit may be instituted more with a view to obtaining a settlement
resulting in fees to the plaintiff’s attorney than to righting a wrong to the corporation
(the so-called “strike suit”).

MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT, Introductory Comment, Subchapter D.
277. See supra Part II.c.7.c, for a discussion of aggregation.
278. Section 11(e) of the Securities Act of 1933 provides:
In any suit under this or any other section of this subchapter the court may, in its
discretion, require an undertaking for the payment of the costs of such suit, including
reasonable attorney’s fees, and if judgment shall be rendered against a party litigant,
upon the motion of the other party litigant, such costs may be assessed in favor of such
party litigant (whether or not such undertaking has been required) if the court believes
the suit or the defense to have been without merit, in an amount sufficient to reimburse
him for the reasonable expenses incurred by him, in connection with such suit, such
costs to be taxed in the manner usually provided for taxing of costs in the court in which
the suit was heard.

15 U.S.C. § 77k(e) (West 1998). 18(a) of the Securities Exchange Act also permit a court
to require security from either party. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78i(f), 78r(a). For additional
discussion on this, see DEMOTT, supra note 44, § 3.4.
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of office or voting with their feet and selling their ownership interests? In
other words, are these statutes actually protecting shareholders from some
threat that would not be handled by state law claims of violation of
fiduciary duty? The challenge for academics and practitioners is how to
measure the existence and degree of any such protection. It seems naïve
and simplistic to assume that shareholders who are not required to post
security as a result somehow become altruistic, or at least exercise
common sense and good judgment. They may nonetheless think they have
an axe to grind.
The Wood Report concluded that security for expense statutes were
the sole and exclusive way to protect the balance between allowing
shareholders to hold their corporations accountable and allowing those
corporations to conduct the business of shareholder maximization free
from myriad nuisance or strike suits. But using share ownership levels or
market value as the sole metric to measure shareholders’ intentions is a
risky proposition.279 As with any bright line test, the metric may not get it
right. Some valid claims by thoughtful shareholders acting in good faith
may never be raised if they cannot satisfy the security for expense statute.
Likewise, some meritless claims can and have been brought by
shareholders who are not required to post security.
The prudent course is to broaden the application of the MBCA
provisions for ordering expenses after the matter has been adjudicated and
encourage all states to adopt any of the three provisions that have not yet
been enacted there. First, if the lawsuit resulted in a “substantial” benefit
to the corporation, the plaintiff is entitled to expenses from the
defendant.280 This should be modified to add the idea that such expenses
must be reasonable, to avoid opportunistic behavior by the parties.
279. According to Professor DeMott:
The reasoning of the Wood Report appears naive, or at least anachronistic, in two
respects. First, nothing in the report anticipates the widespread use of intervention to
exempt the original plaintiff from the security requirements. Second, the report is
striking in the confidence it reposes in the security requirements as
the exclusive safeguard needed to guard against abusive practices in derivative
litigation; for example, it argues that a security provision would obviate any need to
require court approval of discontinuances and settlements of actions. Finally, the
Report’s methodology and motivations have received trenchant criticism over the
years, but this appears not to have undermined completely the appeal of the Report’s
conclusions.

DEMOTT, supra note 44, § 3.2.
280. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 7.46(1).
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According to the MBCA comments, the substantial benefit requirement
is necessary “to prevent the plaintiff from proposing inconsequential
changes in order to justify the payment of counsel fees.”281 This is helpful
but begs the question of what constitutes a “substantial” benefit. Clarity
and uniformity in the parameters of this definition would allow similarly
situated parties to be treated similarly.
Next, if instead of finding a substantial benefit, the court finds that
the derivative proceeding was “commenced or maintained without
reasonable cause or for an improper purpose[,]” the court may order the
plaintiff to pay the defendant’s expenses.282 Unlike the proposed
modification to Section 7.46(1), the official comments give us some
guidance as to what constitutes an “improper purpose” which can aid in
the effort to promote uniform treatment for similarly situated parties:
The test in this section is similar to but not identical with the test
utilized in section 13.31, relating to dissenters’ rights, where the
standard for award of expenses is that dissenters “acted arbitrarily,
vexatiously or not in good faith” in demanding a judicial appraisal of
their shares. The derivative action situation is sufficiently different
from the dissenters’ rights situation to justify a different and less
onerous test for imposing costs on the plaintiff. The test of section
7.46 that the action was brought without reasonable cause or for an
improper purpose is appropriate to deter strike suits, on the one hand,
and on the other hand to protect plaintiffs whose suits have a
reasonable foundation.283

Finally, states that have not done so should add in the ideas in MBCA
Sections 7.46(2) and (3), which address other abuses and opportunistic
conduct by the parties in derivative suits that were not “commenced or
maintained without reasonable cause or for an improper purpose.”284 This
broad language also picks up misbehavior on the part of the parties’
counsel.285

281.
282.
283.
284.
285.

Id. § 7.46 cmt. (2007).
Id. § 7.46(2).
Id. § 7.46 cmt.
Id. § 7.46(2).
Id. § 7.46(3).
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CONCLUSION
Whether security for expense statutes are effective at all is difficult
to say. Since there are so few cases involving them, case law interpreting
these statutes and describing the rights and options of derivative plaintiffs
would be illustrative. But more salient than the broad question of whether
these statutes are working is the embedded issue of how we can measure
whether five percent or $200,000 is the “right” number to weed out strike
suits but magically capture meritorious suits. There seems to be no way
to be sure. In the absence of evidence that these statutes are helping, and
in the further absence of any meaningful way to quantify this, perhaps the
prudent course is to stick with a statutory scheme that allows courts to
award costs to unsuccessful derivative plaintiffs ex post, instead of
requiring security to be posted ex ante.

